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[L.A. No. 22761.

In Bank.

Jan. 24, 1957.]

THE SANTA BARBARA COUNTY WATER AGENCY,
Respondent, v. A.LL PERSONS AND PARTIES etc.,
Defendants; MAURICE A. BALAAM et aL, Appellants.
[1] Waters-County Water Agencies-Confirmation and Validation Proceedings.-A proceeding by a county water agency to
secure a judicial determination of the legality of the establishment of such agency and its member units and the validity
of a master contract between the agency and the United States
and member unit contracts entered into between the agency
and city and county water districts is a special proceeding
in rem brought against all persons having or claiming to have
any interest in the formation of the agency, in the proceedings
of the various contracting entities leading to execution of the
contracts, in the operation of such contracts and in the property affected thereby, and final judgment forecloses further
inquiry into the matters to which the judgment properly
relates, and within its legitimate issues is binding on the world
at large.
[2] !d.-County Water Agencies-Contracts-Property and Water
Rights.-Under a contract between a county water agency
and the United States for a water supply system to be
constructed, operated, and maintained by the Bureau of Reclamation, the relationship between the parties was that of debtor
and creditor, contemplating a state project to be eventually
owned and operated locally, and the domestic water appropriated for beneficial use must be devoted to a use consistent with
the purpose of the appropriation and the trust relationship
existing between the United States and the water users
entitled to service within the agency.
[3] State of California-Fiscal Matters-Limitations on Disposal
-Gift of Public Funds.-Generally, a contribution from one
public agency to another for a purely local purpose of the
donee agency is in violation of Const., art. IV, § 31, prohibiting
a gift of public funds, but such a contribution is legal if it
serves the public purpose of the donor agency though it is
beneficial to local purposes of the donee agency.
[3] See Cal.Jur., State of California, § 23.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 14-17] Waters,§ 594.5;
[3] State of California, § 33; [4] Waters, § 1; [7] Taxation, § 21;
[10] Municipal Corporations, § 98; [12, 13] Improvements-Public,
§ 23.
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and beneficial use of domestic
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[5] !d.-County Water Agencies-Validity of Statute.--The legislative determination that those
of a statute (Santa
Barbara County Water Agency
Stats. 1945, p. 2780)
whereby a county water agency could
funds in assistpurposes
ance of member units in furtherance of the
served by the statute is entitled to a strong presumption of
cons ti tu tionali ty.
[6] !d.-County \Vater Agencies.-The financial assistance of a
county water agency in making an overall plan feasible to
member units is a proper means of effecting the public purpose
for the general good of the whole area served
the agency.
[7] Taxation-Delegation of Taxing Power.-The limitations of
Const., art. XI, § 12, do not prevent the Legislature from
authorizing a district to impose taxes for a state purpose or
for a purpose that transcends the boundaries of the various
municipalities that may be included within the limits of a
larger district.
[8] Waters-County Water Agencies-Validity of Statute.Const., art. XI, § 12, does not invalidate the power given a
county water agency by the statute creating it by levying· a
special tax solely within the defaulting nwmber unit to cure
the defaulted obligation owing the agency, since a larger
district, in assessing benefits, can establish zones for that
purpose in different portions of the district, and since the levy
prescribed is a protection for the county water agency, is not
local as to the member units but transcends their boundaries,
and does not violate the "municipal purpose" clause of the
constitutional provision.
[9] !d.-County Water Agencies-Validity of Statute.-The Santa
Barbara County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1945, p. 2780, as
amended by Stats. 1949, p. 18) docs not violate Const., art.
XI, § 6, declaring that corporations for municipal purposes
shall not be created by special laws, since the term ''municipal
purposes" has referencP 1o the purposes of "cities and
towns."
[10] Municipal Corporations-General Powers-Extraterritorial
Powers.-Gencrally, where the scopr; of a project transcends
the boundaries of a municipality it ceases to be for a municipal
purpose.
[11] Waters-County Water Agencies-Assessments-Benefits.Where a county water agency was created by special act of
the Legislature wherein it was determined what lands were to
[7] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 33; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 147.
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be assessed for the benefit of the public improvement, the
owners were not entitled to a hearing on the question
of benefits to the land included within the district since they
are conclusively presumed to have been heard through their
in the Legislature, but such a determination
cannot be
or without factual basis.
Improvements-Public-Apportionment of Burden.-'l'he fixing of the district which is to bear the expense of a local
and the mode in which such expense is to be
borne and distributed, are primarily legislative questions.
[13] !d.-Apportionment of Burden.-The Legislature may apply
the ad valorem method of assessment in a local improvement
district without any judicial inquiry into or determination of
the extent of the benefits.
[14] Waters-County Water Agencies-Apportionment of Burden.
-The inclusion of all lands within its boundaries in a county
water agency and the imposition of an ad valorem tax on such
lands on the ground that they would benefit by the agency's
operation was a matter properly determined by the Legislature.
[15] !d.-County Water Agencies-Validity of Statute.-The purposes of "controlling and conserving storm, flood and other
surface waters for any benet1cial use and for the protection
of life and property" in the entire district are within the legitimate scope of a statute creating a county water agency.
[16] !d.-County Water Agencies-Property and Water Rights.Excess land provisions in contracts between a county water
agency and the Uniterl States for a supply of water to such
agency are inapplicable and, if not declared to be so, would
deprive landowners of the member units of their property
rights without due process of law and constitute a denial of
equal protection of the laws; the United States is acting
in its proprietary capacity as a purveyor of domestic waters
of the state to the agency and its member units, and is bound
to observe and comply with state laws with reference to the
rights of water users being served; and the contract is
innllid insofar as it provides, by implication or otherwise,
that the United States can arbitrarily cause to he discontinued
the distribution of water to those for whose bPnefit the right
to the water was acquired in the first instance.
[17] !d.-County Water Agencies-Confirmation and Validation
Proceedings-AppeaL-In a proceeding by a county water
agency to secure a judicial determination of the legality of
the establishment of such agency and its HH,mber units and the
validity of a mastr;r contract between the agency and the
United States and membel' unit eontracts entered into by
the agency with a city and county water districts, an appeal
from a judgment for the agency confirming the validity of
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such contracts may properly be taken by the objecting defendants within some 35 days after entry of the judgment,
though the statute creating such agency provides that any
"party may appeal at any time within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment," since the intent of the "permissive"
appeal provisions of such statute are doubtful, and there is no
reason why the appeal should not be entertained within the
60-day period prescribed by Rules on Appeal, rule 2 (a).

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Barbara County. Charles F. Blackstock, Judge.* Affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
Proceeding by a county water agency to secure a judicial
determination of the legality of the establishment of such
agency and its member units and the validity of a master
contract between the agency and the United States and member unit contracts entered into between the agency and certain public bodies. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed insofar
as it declared validity of existence of agency and member
units, and reversed insofar as judgment declared validity of
contracts.
Sherman Anderson and W. P. Butcher for Appellants.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Herman Phleger, Alvin J.
Rockwell and John M. Na:ff, Jr., as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Appellants.
Vern B. Thomas, District Attorney (Santa Barbara), and
Lawrence M. Parma, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg
and Adolphus Moskovitz, Deputy Attorneys General, J. Lee
Rankin, Solicitor General of the Fnited States, Perry W.
Morton, Assistant Attorney General, David R. Warner and
Roger P. Marquis, Attornc>ys, Departnwnt of ,Justice,t and
Price, Postel & Parma as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
*Assigned by Chainnan of Judicial Council.
tReporter's Note: The recmd on appeal docs not show that any attorneys for the federal government participated in thP trial court proceedings, and the named counsel filed no hric>fs on appeal and did not otherwise participate except that they filed a mPmonmdum as Amici Curine
in support of the petition for a rehearing.
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SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for the
plaintiff Santa Barbara County \Vater Agency confirming the
validity of a so-called ''Master Contract'' between the agency
and the United States, acting by and through the Bureau
of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior, and five
so-called "Member Unit Contracts" between the plaintiff and
each of five public bodies, namely, the city of Santa Barbara,
and the Carpinteria, Summerland, Montecito and Goleta
County Water Districts.
The plaintiff as petitioner commenced this proceeding on
February 8, 1950, pursuant to section 11.10 of Santa Barbara
County Water Agency Act (Act 7303, Stats. 1945, p. 2780;
amended by Stats. 1949, p. 18) to secure a judicial determination of the legality of the establishment of the agency and
its member units, and the validity of the master contract
and the five-member unit contracts entered into by the agency.
Such a determination is required by article 35 of the master
contract, by articles 36 of each of the member unit contracts,
and by federal law (Omnibus Adjustment Act of 1926, § 46, 44
Stats, 649,650,43 U.S.C. §423e). [1] It is a special proceeding in rem and summons was by publication. It was
brought against all persons having or claiming to have any
interest in the formation of the agency, in the proceedings
of the various contracting entities leading to the execution of
the contracts, in the operation of the proposed contracts and
in the property affected thereby. A final judgment will foreclose further inquiry into the matters to which the judgment
properly relates, and within its legitimate issues it will be
binding on the world at large. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All
Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], and cases there cited.)
The answering defendants are Maurice A. Balaam, Ted R.
Holden, William G. Sudden, W. G. Moore, R. E. Sudden,
Charles E. Sudden and L. H. Crandall. The default of all
other defendants was duly entered on May 1, 1950.
The petition alleged six causes of action each seeking the
confirmation of one of the contracts involved. The defendants demurred to each count on both general and special
grounds. The demurrers were overruled. The defendants'
answer denied the validity of the formation of the plaintiff
agency, certain proceedings of the board of directors of the
agency leading to and including the signing of the master
contract, the master contract itself, the proceedings of the
respective boards of directors of the different member units
leading to and including the signing of the respective member
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unit contrads alHl the
the ~member unit
contracts.
'l'he defendants also pleaded nine affirmative defenses to
each of the causes of action. In substance it is alleged: (1)
that provisions in the member unit contracts authorized by
the Santa Barbara County "\Yater Agency Act, whereby the
agency will levy ad valorem taxes on all property in the agency
to establish a fund from which contributions will be made
to the member units, violate the constitutional provisions
against legislative gifts and authorization of the imposition of
local taxes by special legislation (art. IV, § 13 and art. XI,
§ 12 of the state Constitution) ; (2) that the Santa Barbara
Water Agency Act purports to give the agency the power to
levy ad valorem taxes on all property in the city of Santa
Barbara and the various county water districts in violation
of the constitutional prohibition of the imposition of taxes on
individuals or property within public corporations for municipal purposes (art. XI, § 12 of the state Constitution); (3)
that the Santa Barbara Water Agency Act is unconstitutional
in that it subjects the defendants to taxation and assessment
on lands which cannot possibly be benefited from the construction of the project; ( 4) that any determination, legislative or otherwise, that the defendants' lands will be benefited
by the project is arbitrary and contrary to any rational view
based on evidence of investigation; (5) that the contracts provide for no distribution of water to parcels owned by a single
person in excess of 160 acres, but that the excess lands are
nevertheless subject to taxation for project purposes; (6)
that the contracts are impossible of performance and lacking
in consideration; (7) that the contracts (except the city of
Santa Barbara Member Unit Contract) purport to prohibit
the exclusion from the district of lands not benefited by the
project, without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior;
that section 23202 of the "\Yater Code condones such provisions,
and that both the contracts and section 23202 violate the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power under the
state Constitution (art. IV, § 1); (8) that the provisions of
section 9 (c) (2) and (e) of the Reclamation Project Act
of 1939 (53 Stats. 1187, 43 U.S.C., § 485), pursuant to which
the contracts purport to have been executed, constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of power to the Secretary of the
Interior, and (9) that those provisions of the contracts which
provide that the United States is entitled to all waste, seepage,
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and return flow \Yater derived from water supplied under the
contracts to the member units through the agency, are invalid
under the federal reclamation laws and the law of the state
which make such waters appurtenant to the lands irrigated.
The agency demurred generally to each of the affirmative
defenses and the demurrers were sustained.
The causes >vere tried on November 14, 1951, and a judgment was entered on October 22, 1952. The judgment declared
(a) the legality of the organization and existence of the
agency, the city of Santa Barbara and the four county water
districts, (b) the due execution of the six contracts, (c) the
lawfulness of the contracts, and (d) that the defendants had
waived and were estopped from asserting the illegality or
unconstitutionality of the agency and of the Santa Barbara
County Agency Act. The defendants have appealed from all
portions of the judgment. The Attorney General of the State
of California has appeared as amicus curiae in support of
the judgment, and the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation has
appeared as amicus curiae asserting the invalidity of the
contract.
The county of Santa Barbara is situated in a semiarid
portion of Southern California. It has no common source of
water supply that can serve the entire county but contains
numerous noncontiguous watersheds. The county has grown
greatly in population and developed an economy requiring
full utilization and development of all available water supplies. For many years the county made investigations and
engineering surveys of its water resources utilizing private,
public and United States engineers for that purpose. Pursuant thereto, in June, 1945, a comprehensive water development plan for the county was submitted by the Bureau of
Reclamation, and the Santa Barbara County Water Agency
was formed by the Legislature in 1945 to carry out the plan.
The agency's boundaries are coextensive with those of the
county and the lands served by all member units lie within
its boundaries.
Commencing in 1946 the agency began negotiations for a
water supply from the Cachuma Unit of the Santa Barbara
County Project, described in House Document Number 587
of the 80th Congress, 2d Session of April 1, 1948. That
document reveals that the Cachuma Unit will consist of the
Cachuma Dam and Reservoir on the Santa Ynez River, the
Tecelote Transmountain Diversion Tunnel and the South Coast
47 C.2d-23

[47 C.2d
and maintained
to federal reclamation
that the water to be diverted for purposes of the
is unappropriated water to be appropriated under
state law, and that the estimated cost of construction of
the Cachuma Unit, exclusive of
distribution works,
is $28,610,000. This amount is to be reimbursed to the United
States by
for water in excess of the costs of upkeep,
operation and maintenance over a period calculated not to
exceed 50 years. [2] It is apparent that what we have said
in Ivanhoe Ir1·. Dist. v. AU Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d
824], is equally true in the present case, namely, that the
relationship between the parties is that of debtor and creditor,
contemplating a state project to be eventually owned and operated locally, and that the domestic water herein appropriated
for beneficial use must be and can only be devoted to a use
consistent with the purpose of the appropriation and the trust
relationship existing between the United States and the water
users entitled to service within the agency.
The contracts in question are for the furnishing of domestic
water by a purveyor thereof at a stipulated price. They do
not involve the construction of distribution systems, as in
the Ivanhoe and Madera cases. (Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. All
Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824]; M.adcra Irr. Dist. v.
A.ll Persons, ante, p. 681 [306 P.2d 886] .) The master
contract contemplates a supply of water for irrigation, municipal, domestic, industrial and other uses to be furnished and
delivered to each member unit of the agency for a period of
40 years, specifying delivery points, time of delivery and
maximum rates for various classes of water. The agency is
charged with the payments for all water delivered to member
units. Provisions other than those specifically objected to
by the defendants in their affirmative defenses provide for
the storage of water, availability of excess water, responsibility
for water shortage, the recognition by the bureau of existing
water rights, transfers of water by member units, defaults
in payments, inspection of books and records by the bureau
and other provisions not here material.
The member unit contracts, identical in form, are in general
repetitions of the master contract except as to the contracting
parties and the changes made necessary by the substitution
thereof. Payments for water to be delivered are to be made
by member units to the agency. Those features of the
master contract which are objected to are contained also in
each of the member unit contracts.
""""'>r<>,fi
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relates to the
of the Santa
Act and the existence of the contracting entities. The contracts
that the agency and the
member units initiate legal nl'(\"''Ni
which seek not only
the confirmation of the contracts but also
of the
of the
of the
member units.
in their first affirmative defense that the act violates section
31 of article IV of the Constitution, which prohibits legislafunds. Section
tive authorization for the donation of
10.2 of the act provides in part that the agency shall have
the power to exprnd any or all of thr funds or contributions
in aid of: (a) the construction or payment of the eost of
works; (b) the purchase or obtaining of '\Vater or a water
supply; and (c) the payment of any liability "assumed
as principal, guarantor, or underwriter on an indebtedness
in connection ·with such construction, payment, purchase or
obtaining; if such works are constructed or said water or
water supply is obtained for or on behalf of the agency or
its member units . . . . " In accordance with the above and
other provisions of the act (see § 5.1) the agency has agreed
in its contracts to pay for >Yater furnished to member units
to the extent of $100,000 annually, prorated among the member units in accordance with their respective annual payments
to the agency. This, it is contended, constitutes a gift of
public funds and a violation of section 31, article IV.
[3] It is the general rule that a contribution from one
public agency to another for a purely local purpose of the
donee agency is in violation of the constitutional prohibition,
hut that such a contribution is legal if it serves the publie
purpose of the donor agency even though it is beneficial to
local purposes of the donee agency. (Pacific JJiutual Life
Ins. Co. v. County of Ban Diego, 112 CaL 314 [41 P. 423,
44 P. 571] .) Thus in City of Oakland v. Garrison, 194 Cal.
298 [228 P. 433], payment by the county of Alameda to the
city of Oakland to improve a street entirely within the city
was held to be proper where the county board of supervisors
found it 'ivould he for the general good of the county. And
in County of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal.2d 625 [59 P.2d
139, 106 A.I1.R. 903], it was held that the state could impose
a statewide tax on motor vehicles and then apportion some
of the proeeeds to the couuti(•s for local use because a statewise
public purpose was being served. ''The determination of what
constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for legis-
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lative discretion [citations] which is not disturbed by the
courts so long as it has a reasonable basis [citations]. This
court has frequently upheld the expenditure of funds by the
state or by its subdivisions for the benefit of individuals as
for a 'public purpose' and hence not within section 31 of
Article IV." (County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276
at 281 [106 P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141]; see also County of Los
Angeles v. La Fttente, 20 Cal.2d 870, 876 [129 P.2d 378] ;
Caliform:a Emp. Stab. Com. v. Payne, 31 Cal.2d 210, 216
[187 P.2d 702] .)
[4] That the conservation and beneficial use of the domestic waters of this state serve a public purpose is without
question. ( Const., art. XIV, § 3.) [5] The legislative determination that those provisions of the act whereby the
agency could expend funds in assistance to member units
in furtherance of the public purposes served by the act is
entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality and
nothing appears herein to dispel that presumption. [6] The
financial assistance of the agency in making the overall plan
economically feasible to the member units is a proper means
of effecting the public purpose for the general good of the
whole of the area served by the agency.
It is next contended by the defendants in both their first
and second affirmative defenses that the act creating the
agency is in violation of article XI, section 12 of the Constitution, which forbids the Legislature to levy taxes on public
corporations, or upon the property thereof, "for county, city,
town, or other municipal purposes but may, by general laws,
vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess
and collect taxes for such purposes. . . . ''
[7] The limitations of section 12 do not prevent the Legislature from authorizing a district to impose taxes for a state
purpose (Joint Highway Dist. No. 18 v. Hinman, 220 Cal.
578, 588 [32 P. 144]), nor for a purpose that transcends the
boundaries of the various municipalities that may be included
within the limits of a larger district (Henshaw v. Foster, 176
Cal. 507, 511 [169 P. 82]; Pixley v. Saunders, 168 Cal. 152
[ 141 P. 815].) In view of the declaration of section 3, article
XIV of the Constitution, that "because of conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the water
resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of whieh they are capable, and that the waste or
unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be
prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to be

Jan.

SANTA BARBARA ETc. AGENCY v. ALL PERSONS 709
[47 C.2d 699; 306 P.2d 8751

exercised with
to the reasonable and beneficial use
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare . . . , " it is contended by the agency that it serves more
than a "county, city, town or other municipal purpose" within the meaning of section 12, and that the constitutional
prohibition is therefore inapplicable in the present situation.
This contention has support in the legislative and decisional
law of the state. In spite of numerous enactments for the
conservation of water wherein the power to levy taxes and
assessments was conferred on an agency of the state, and in
numerous cases where the constitutionality of such enactments
was questioned on various grounds, no case is referred to or
has been found wherein a specially created district with taxing
powers similar in scope to those of the present agency has
been held to be unconstitutional by reason of section 12.
(Cf. Municipal Home Rnle in California, John C. Peppin, 34
Cal.L.Rev. 644.)
[8] It is also contended that section 12 of article XI
invalidates the power given the agency by section 10.3 of the
act by levying a special tax solely within the defaulting member unit to cure the defaulted financial obligation owing the
agency. But a larger district, in assessing benefits, can establish zones for that purpose in different portions of the district.
(See Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton,
177 Cal. 119, at 128 [169 P. 1028] .) The levy prescribed
by section 10.3 of the act is a protection for the agency, is not
local as to the member units but transcends their boundaries
and does not violate the "municipal purpose" clause of
section 12 of article XI. (Pixley v. Saunders, sttpra, 168 Cal.
152; Pasadena v. Chamberlain, 204 Cal. 653 [269 P. 630];
County of Los Angeles v. Httnt, 198 Cal. 753 [247 P. 897] .)
It is also contended, although not specifically set out in any
of the affirmative defenses, that the special enactment of the
Santa Barbara County Water Agency Act is in violation of
section 6, article XI of the Constitution, which provides in
part: ''Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be
created by special laws; but, the Legislature shall, by general
laws, provide for the incorporation, organization and classification, in proportion to population, of cities and towns .... "
The question is whether the agency has been created for
"municipal purposes" within the meaning of the above
section.
[9] It would appear from a reading of the section that
the term ''municipal purposes'' has reference to the purposes
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by
the court in
[198
P. 1060, 17 A.L.R
court had before it the
uuoauJtu;;, of ''
'' as employed in section
1 of article XIII of the Constitution. In defining that expression as not to include an
district the court referred
to section 6, article
and stated at page 188
''At the
same election article XI, section 6, was amended by the people.
This section restricts the power of the legislature in the
formation of municipal corporations, to providing by general
law for their formation, and prohibits the formation of such
corporation by special statute. That section uses the term
'municipal corporation' as synonymous with 'cities and
towns.''' (See also Lagttna Beach Gmvnty ·water Dist. v.
Orange County, 30 Cal..App.2d 740, 743 [87 P.2d 46]; People
v. Rinner, 62 Cal..App. 747, 751 [199 P. 1066].)
[10] Generally it is true that where the scope of a project
transcends the boundaries of a municipality it ceases to be
for a municipal purpose. (See Pixley v. Saunders, sttpra,
168 Cal. 152; Cmmty of Los Lingeles v. IIunt, supra, 198 Cal.
753; Ga.dd v. McGtti1·e, 69 Cal..App. 347 [231 P. 754].) In
Pasadena v. Chamberlain, S1tpra, 204 Cal. 653, involving the
constitutionality of the Metropolitan Water District .Act with
respect to article XI, section 6, this court held that in the
combined operations of several municipalities under the act,
''the municipalities engaged therein could not be held to be
engaged in the conduct of a merely municipal affair.'' .A
similar conclusion was reached in Van de Water v. Pridham.
33 Cal..App. 252, 259 [164 P. 1136], relative to drainag~
ditches constructed partly within a city under the Drainage
Act of 1903; and in Pasadena Park Imp. Go. v. Lelande, 175
Cal. 511 [166 P. 341], relating to a protection district (Stats.
1895, p. 248) to protect against floods and including city lands.
Numerous cases have established that special legislation in
the creation of various types of districts dealing with water
problems is not in contravention of the "municipal purpose"
clause of section 6 of article XI. (People v. Levee Dist. No.6,
131 Cal. 30 [63 P. 676] [levee district]; People v. Sacramento
Drainage Dist., 155 Cal. 373 [103 P. 207] [drainage district];
Redamation District No. 70 v. Shennan, 11 Cal..App. 399 [105
P. 277], and Peterson v. Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal..App. 670
l225 P. 28] [reclamation districts] ; Barber v. Galloway, 195
Cal. 1, 13 [231 P. 34] [combined irrigation, drainage and
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water distribution
Palo Verde
Dis.)
It is noted that the cases have made distinetions between
the meaning to be
to the terms '
''
or ''municipal purposes,''
upon the
tion of the Constitution to which the definition relates.
dissenting
Chief Justice Beatty
of San
111ateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, at page 637
P. 78, 621].)
It is concluded that the agency is not
a purely
municipal function within the meaning of section 6 of article
XI and the decisional law thereon.
The invalidity of the act is also urged
the defendants in
their third and fourth afiirmative defenses on the ground,
generally, that the only lands receiving benefits thereunder
are those within the member units; that considerable portions
of land within the boundaries of the agency are not within
any member unit and therefore are not benefited by the
act, and that the levy of an ad valorem tax on all lands within
the agency authorized by the act is a taking of property without due process of law. This contention has often been litigated under similar circumstances. The basis question relates
to a proper finding of a benefit conferred on lands not directly
served. [11] In the present case the agency was created by
a special act of the Legislature wherein it was determined
what lands were to be assessed for the benefit of the public
improvement. In such circumstances "the property owners
are not entitled to a hearing on the question of benefits to
the land included within the district for they are conclusively
presumed to have been heard through their representatives in
the legislature." (Orosi Public Utility Dz:st., In re, 196 Cal.
43, 50 [235 P. 1004] .) Such a determination, however, cannot
be arbitrary, capricious or without factual basis.
[12] The basis of proper legislative determination of benefits conferred on all lands within a district is dealt with exhaustively in Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v.
II amilton, supra, 177 Cal. 119, and that case is determinative
of the contentions in the present case. There claims of lack
of direct benefit of all lands within the district were the
same for all material purposes as those urged by the defendants in their third and fourth affirmative defenses. Beginning
at page 123 this eourt stated: '"fhe warrant and justification
for charging the cost of such improvement upon designated
lands is to be found, in theory at least, in the benefit to be
derived by the lands assessed from the contemplated work.
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(Reclamat-ion Dist. v. Birks, 159 Cal. 233, 241 [113 P. 170].)
. . . The fixing of the district which is to bear the expense of a
local improvement, and the mode in which such expense is
to be borne and distributed, are primarily legislative questions.
. . . But since the imposition of such costs finds its ground
of sanction in the benefits conferred upon the lands charged,
it may well be that the legislative conclusion should not be
upheld where the court can see that it is contrary to any
rational view of the facts, and that lands have been included
that 'plainly could not by any fair or proper view of the facts
be benefited.' . . . '' The court proceeded to examine the
facts, noting that the district contained "several separate and
unconnected watersheds''; that it ''comprised a considerable
area of mountainous land"; that much of the district lay
"above the plane of any flood waters which are to be anticipated,'' and that other lands were beyond the area of possible
floods. Conceding that such lands could not be directly benefited, the court held that "the benefit which would justify the
inclusion of land within the district need not be so direct and
immediate as is assumed in the argument of counsel opposing
the validity of the act.'' In referring to numerous cases
involving problems closely related to the present one, the court
concluded that an "examination of these cases will show that
the courts have regarded an incidental or indirect benefit as
sufficient to justify the imposition of a part of the burden of
the improvement. Such indirect benefit may result from the
improvement of neighboring and surrounding land, and the
consequent increase in the value of all land within the district.
. . . The proper maintenance of the harbors by protecting
them from flood damage, the preservation of the means of
communication between the different parts of the district by
guarding against damage to highways and bridges . . . these
are purposes whose execution may well be of substantial and
immediate benefit to all of the lands included within the district." [13] As to the imposition of an ad valorem tax, the
court had this to say, beginning at page 124: "It is thoroughly settled that the legislature may apply the ad valorem
method of assessment, without any judicial inquiry into, or
determination of, the extent of benefits. Recognizing that
absolute equality cannot be attained under any system of
taxation or assessment, the courts hold that constitutional
requirements are satisfied by that approximation to equality
which may fairly be thought to result from an assessment of
the cost upon the property benefited in proportion to its
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ascertained value. (Burnett v. Mayor, etc.
Sacramento,
12 Cal. 76, 84 [73 Am.Dec. 518] ; In re Madem Irr. Dist., 92
Cal. 296 [27 Am.St.Rep. 106, 14 L.RA. 755, 28 P. 272, 675];
'l'homas v. Pridharn, 171 Cal. 98, 104 [153 P. 933] ; Fallbrook
Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, supra [164 U.S. 112 (17 S.Ct. 56, 41
L.Ed. 369)].)"
[14] From the foregoing it is apparent that the inclusion
of all of the lands within the agency and the imposition
of an ad valorem tax on all of these lands on the ground
that they would benefit by the operation thereof was a matter
properly determined by the Legislature. [15] It is noted
that among the purposes for which the agency was created
are ''controlling and conserving storm, flood and other surface
waters for any beneficial use and for the protection of life
and property in said district." ( Stats. 1945, p. 2780.) Those
indirect benefits referred to in Los Angeles Flood Control
District v. Hamilton, supra, and conferred upon all of the
lands within the agency, appear to be well within the legitimate scope of the act.
[16] In their fifth affirmative defense the defendants raise
issues which have been discussed and disposed of in Ivanhoe
Irr. Dist. v. .c1Zl Parties, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d 824], and
in Madera In·. Dist. v. All Persons, ante, p. 681 [306 P.2d
886]. In accordance therewith it is concluded that the excess
land provisions of the contracts involved here, which are
substantially the same as those in the Ivanhoe and Madera
contracts, are inapplicable and if not declared to be so would
deprive the landowners of the member units of their property
rights without due process of law and constitute a denial of
the equal protection of the la>vs; that the United States is
acting in its proprietary capacity as a purveyor of the domestic waters of the state to the agency and its member units;
that it is bound to observe and comply with the laws of the
state with reference to the rights of the water users being
served, and that the contract is invalid insofar as it, by implication or otherwise, provides that the United States can arbitrarily cause to be discontinued the distribution of water to those
for whose benefit the right to the water was acquired in the
first instance.
Numerous other grounds for the invalidity of the contracts
are asserted. It is stated in the defendants' sixth affirmative
defense that the contracts are lacking in consideration and
are impossible of performance, in their seventh and eighth
affirmative defenses that provisions in the contracts author-

( § f:j
power to the
of the Interior
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and provisions in the state Constitution
IV, §
and in the ninth
affirmative defense that the
the United
States to all
seepage and return flow are invalid. 'l'hese
contentions are
when considered with
what has been said herein
Ivanhoe and Madera
cases as to the matters
which the
may
properly contract.
Questions have been raised as to the
of certain
proceedings leading to the execution of the contracts and the
notice of elections for their confirmation. Such questions need
not be determined in this case for the reason that upon a
submission of any further proposed contracts the alleged
defects need not recur.
The attorney general appearing as amicus curiae in behalf
of the State of California in support of the judgment, questions the right of the appellants to prosecute this appeal. It
appears that the notice of appeal was filed some 35 days after
entry of the judgment. Section 11.10 of the Santa Barbara
County ·water Agency Act provides in part that any "party
may appeal at any time within 30 days after the entry of the
judgment." It is contended that the failure to appeal within
the time specified requires that the appeal be dismissed by
the court of its O'Nn motion, even if no objection has been
made by any party to the proceeding. (In re Horowitz, 33
Cal.2d 534, 537 [203 P.2d 513] ; Estate of Hanley, 23 Cal.2d
120, 123 [142 P.2d 423, 149 A.L.R. 1250] .)
[17] The appellants assert that the 30-day period within
which an appeal "may" be taken in pursuance of section
11.10 of the act is permissive and not mandatory. Section
2 ( i) of the act provides that "may" is permissive and "shall"
is mandatory. Section 11.10 of the act, after setting forth
the special provision for the time in which to appeal, states
further that the ''rules of pleading and practice not inconsistent with the provisions of this section, are applicable to
all actions or proceedings provided for by this section.'' Rule
2 (a) of the Rules on Appeal provide that "Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, notice of appeal shall be
filed within 60 days from the date of entry of the judgment. . . . "
The appellants contend that as the special provision is
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'
the latter
should control.
declaration in section 11.10 of the act:
for
this
the court shall
does not affect

the cause will be heard on its merits.
207 Cal.
452
P. 1025] ; San
Francisco v. Certain Real Estate, 42 Cal. 513.) In People v.
Bank
San Lnis Obispo, 152 CaL 261, it is said at page 264
P. 481] : "The right of appeal is remedial and in doubtful
cases the doubt should be resolved in favor of the right \vhenthe substantial interests of a
are affected
a
judgment.'
The intent of the so-called "permissive" appeal provisions
of section 11.10 at best is doubtful and in accordance with
the foregoing no good reason appears why the appeal should
not be entertained.
It is concluded that the judgment insofar as it declares
the validity of the Santa Barbara ·water Agency Act and the
existence of the agency and its member units must be and
hereby is affirmed. Insofar as the judgment confirms and
declares valid the master contract and the :five member unit
contracts it is reversed, the appellants to reeover costs on
appeaL
Sehanee, J.,

.J., and McComb,

coneurred.

GIBSON, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I eoncur in
the views expressed in the portion of the majority opinion
which relates to the Ya1idity of the Santa Barbara Water
Agency Act and the existence of the Agency and its member
units. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in
lvanho!? Irr. Dist. v. All Parti!?s, ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d
, I
with the majority opinion insofar as it
reverses the judgment of the trial court.
Traynor, ,J., concurred.
is a eompanion case to
ante, p. 597 [306 P.2d
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, and for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion
in that ease, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court
here.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February
19, 1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L.A. No. 24226.

In Bank.

Jan. 25, 1957.]

HAYWARD LUMBER AND INVESTMENT COMPANY
(a Corporation), Appellant, v. E. W. BISCAILUZ et al.,
Respondents.
[1] Process-Definition.-An order of court purporting to release an attachment "as to all property except $2,000.00 in
bank account" comes within the definition of "process" in Gov.
Code, § 26660, as including all "orders of courts of justice,"
or judicial officers.
[2] Sheriffs- Liability. -Generally, a sheriff assuming to act
virtute officii warrants that he is possessed of such authority
and, if not authorized, is liable to persons who suffer damage
from steps taken under the belief that he was.
[3] !d.-Service of Process.-In the service of process the sheriff
is responsible only for unreasonably or not reasonably executing it; he must act with reasonable diligence, and reasonable
diligence depends on the particular facts.
[4] !d.-Liability-Release of Property.-Where in an attachment
suit in the superior court defendant's attached bank account
would have been sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's demand, the
court ordered a partial release, which order did not contain
any direction to the sheriff and was not entered in the permanent minutes until a week after its date, the county clerk 4
days after its entry issued his certifieate reciting that notice
[1] See Cal.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, § 1; Arn.Jur.,
Process, § 2.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Sheriffs and Constables, § 17 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Sheriffs, Police and Constables, § 37 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Sheriffs and Constables, § 13; Arn.Jur., Sheriffs,
Police and Constables, § 46 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Process, ~1; [2] Sheriffs, §15; [3]
Sheriffs, § 12; [ 4, 10] Sheriffs, § 18;
Sheriffs, §§ 1, 12; [ 6]
Sheriffs, § 16; [7] Records, § 43; [8] Attachment, § 75; [9] Attachment, § 55.

